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Note
Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy:
When Does a Claim Arise?
Kevin J. Saville
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act1 (CERCLA) and the Bankruptcy Reform
Act 2 (the Bankruptcy Code) increasingly have come into con-
flict in recent years.3 CERCLA seeks to protect public health
and the environment by facilitating the cleanup of environmen-
tal contamination and imposing the costs on the parties respon-
sible for the pollution.4 This objective often involves an
expensive5 and protracted process in which the government
must investigate environmental contamination, carry out the
cleanup, and recoup the costs from various parties.6 The Bank-
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
3. See, eg., Midlantic Natl Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protec-
tion, 474 U.S. 494, 505-07 (1986); Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Burlington N.R.R. (In
re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 951 F.2d 246, 247-50 (9th Cir. 1991); City of New York
v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020, 1023-25 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Remarks of Joel
M. Gross, Justice Department's Environmental and Natural Resource Divi-
sion, reprinted in Bankruptcy, Environmental Lawyers Focus on Clash, Be-
tween Two Areas, Bankr. L. Daily (BNA) (June 6, 1990) (estimating that 12-
15% of the 800 cases on the docket of the Environmental Enforcement Section
involve bankruptcy issues).
4. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, HAZARD-
oUs WASTE CONTAINMENT ACT OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6124-25; H.R. REP. No.
253(HI), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038,
3043.
5. Average site cleanup costs range from $21 million to $30 million. See
A Report to the House Committee on Appropriations, On the Status of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency's Superfund Program, in PRACTICAL AP-
PROACHES TO REDUCE ENvIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS 1988, at 405, 424 (PLI
Real Estate Law & Practice Course Handbook No. 317, 1988).
6. At the end of 1987, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-
ported that it was adding approximately 150 to 200 contaminated sites to the
National Priority List (NPL) each year. See Critics Hit EPA's Superfund Pro-
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ruptcy Code, on the other hand, tries to facilitate a "fresh start"
by providing an expedient and complete process for debtors to
obtain relief from their indebtedness.7
The United States Supreme Court held in Ohio v. Kovacs
that certain monetary obligations associated with cleaning up
environmental contamination represent a "debt" that may be
discharged in bankruptcy.9 Although the Court held that liabil-
ity for environmental cleanup may be discharged, it did not set-
tle when liability under various environmental statutes, most
importantly CERCLA, becomes a bankruptcy "claim."10 If the
liability does not become a "claim" before the potentially re-
sponsible party (PRP) enters bankruptcy, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) will not participate in the distribu-
tion of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, will not have its interest
cut off by the debtor's discharge, and may assert its claims for
the liability after the conclusion of the debtor's bankruptcy
case."1 PRPs have argued that their cleanup liabilities became
gram, Decry Cleanup Speed, Enforcement Efforts, [May 1, 1987-Apr. 30, 1988]
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 1926 (Dec. 18, 1987). The agency reported, how-
ever, that after CERCLA had been in place for seven years, cleanup had been
completed at only 29 sites. Id.
7. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1966); Williams v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
8. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
9. Id. at 280-82. Kovacs was chief executive officer of Chem-Dyne Corpo-
ration. Id. at 276. The State of Ohio sued Kovacs and Chem-Dyne for violat-
ing various state environmental laws. Id. During the pending litigation,
Kovacs agreed to cease further pollution, remove hazardous wastes from
Chem-Dyne's property, and pay the State $75,000 in damages for environmen-
tal injury. Id. Kovacs failed to comply with the agreement and subsequently
filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 276 & n.1.
After appointing a receiver to take possession of Kovacs's assets and en-
force the injunction it had ordered, the State sued to determine whether Ko-
vacs's environmental cleanup obligation would be discharged in bankruptcy.
Id. at 276-77. The Court noted that because the State had dispossessed Kovacs
of his assets through the appointment of a receiver, Ohio's claim was an obliga-
tion to pay money and thus was discharged. Id, at 282-83. The Court expressly
noted, however, that it was not deciding "what the legal consequences would
have been had Kovacs taken bankruptcy before a receiver had been ap-
pointed." Id at 284.
10. The Kovacs Court did not need to address the issue of when the
debtor's liability to cease further pollution and remove hazardous wastes arose
because Kovacs had entered into a prepetition settlement with the State of
Ohio. Id. at 276. Consequently, it was clear that the liability under the envi-
ronmental laws was a prebankruptcy obligation.
11. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141 (1988); see also infra notes 52-53 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Code's discharge provisions). One of the first situ-
ations in which the courts were asked to consider when a bankruptcy claim
came into existence concerned undetected injuries from exposure to asbestos.
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dischargeable claims upon the prebankruptcy release of hazard-
ous substances into the environment.' 2 The government, on
the other hand, has tried to prevent PRPs from escaping
accountability under CERCLA by asserting that the debtor's li-
ability does not become a bankruptcy claim until the govern-
ment has detected and cleaned up the hazardous substances.13
This Note examines when liability for environmental
cleanup under CERCLA becomes a "claim" capable of dis-
charge under the Bankruptcy Code. Part I summarizes CER-
CLA and the Bankruptcy Code. Part II reviews the definition
of "claim" and considers three approaches courts have adopted
to determine when a bankruptcy claim arises. Part III critiques
these three approaches and asserts that none of the three ade-
quately balances the objectives of CERCLA with the purposes
Attempting to avoid the application of the Code's automatic stay and discharge
provisions, asbestos victims and representatives of future asbestos manufactur-
ers asserted that the victims' bankruptcy claims arose with the exposure to the
asbestos. The courts circumvented the issue of when a bankruptcy claim
arises by appointing a representative for future claimants and establishing a
trust fund to compensate victims whose injuries were not manifested until af-
ter the debtor's bankruptcy reorganization. See Amatex Corp. v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co. (In re Amatex Corp.), 107 B.R. 856, 862 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621-22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 78
B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-
Manville), 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988); see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R.
742, 751 (E.D. Va. 1988), qff'd sub nom. A.H. Robins v. Mabey, 880 F.2d 694
(4th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
12. See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997,
1000 (2d Cir. 1991), affg United States v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 112 B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Jensen v. California Dep't of Health
Servs. (In re Jensen), 127 B.R. 27, 30 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), aff'g Jensen v.
Bank of America (In re Jensen), 114 B.R. 700 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990); Sylves-
ter Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N.R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 651-52 (D. Minn. 1991);
United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 834 (D. Minn. 1990).
13. See Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 999; Jensen, 127 B.R. at 29; Union Scrap,
123 B.R. at 834. Two other areas in which debtors and creditors have con-
fronted the issue of when a bankruptcy claim arises involve: the payment of
pension obligations after a divorce decree, compare Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d
989 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that pension liability to beneficiary arose
at time payment became due) and Teichman v. Teichman (In re Teichman),
774 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (same) with Chandler v. Chandler (In re Chan-
dler), 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that liability arose at time of di-
vorce decree), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987); and condominium
maintenance assessments, compare In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1990)
(owner's obligation to pay fees arising after the bankruptcy filing discharged)
and In re Elias, 98 B.R. 332 (N.D. Mll. 1989) (same) with Horton v. Beaumont
Place Homeowners Ass'n (In re Horton), 87 B.R. 650 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987)
(fee obligation not discharged) and Alexandria Knolls West Condominium
Homes Council v. Strelsky (In re Strelsky), 46 B.R. 178 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985)
(same).
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underlying the Bankruptcy Code. This Note recommends that
the bankruptcy courts adopt a test that discharges debtors from
CERCLA liability only to the extent that environmental con-
tamination was foreseeable prior to the conclusion of the
debtor's bankruptcy case. This proposal stretches the scope of
what constitutes a dischargeable bankruptcy claim to its
broadest possible limit without offending CERCLA's cleanup
objectives. Using foreseeability as the dividing line between
what is and what is not dischargeable should encourage disclo-
sure of toxic waste problems and thus expedite environmental
cleanup.
I. CERCLA AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 and the Superfund
Amendments 14 in 1986 as a response to the growing national
problem of pollution from hazardous wastes. 15 CERCLA re-
quires parties handling hazardous substances to notify the EPA
of the storage and release of these materials.16 After it receives
notice of or discovers a release of hazardous substances, 17 the
EPA formulates a response plan'8 and notifies persons who
14. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). In 1986, Con-
gress allocated $8.5 billion to the Superfund. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a). The fund
was designed to reimburse the EPA, state and local governments, and other
parties for the cleanup expenditures they are unable to collect from unidenti-
fied, insolvent, or defunct enterprises. See id. §§ 9611(a)(1)-(2), 9612(a).
15. At the time CERCLA was enacted, congressional sponsors estimated
that industry disposed of 100 billion pounds of hazardous chemical waste annu-
ally, "90 percent of it improperly." See 126 CONG. REc. 26,342 (daily ed. Sept.
19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Gore).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1988). "Release" is defined as "any spilling, leak-
ing,... emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping,
or disposing into the environment." Id. § 9601(22).
17. Whenever the EPA has reason to believe that a release has occurred
or is about to occur it "may undertake such.., investigations as [it] may deem
necessary or appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1988). Although courts have
construed the EPA's investigatory powers broadly, see Lewis M. Barr, CER-
CIA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAw.
923, 924 (1990); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 1458, 1487-88 (1986), hazardous substances often are not detected until
many years after their release actually occurred.
18. After discovering a hazardous release, the EPA assesses the site's de-
gree of risk to human health and the environment using a Hazard Ranking
System (HRS). See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c) (1988). Sites with a sufficiently high
HRS ranking may be placed on the National Priority List (NPL). See 40
[Vol. 76:327
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may be held liable for the cleanup.' 9
Congress provided for unusually broad liability under
CERCLA.20 Persons2 ' who may be held jointly, severally, and
strictly liable22 include individuals, business entities, and the of-
ficers and employees of the business entities. One of the most
severe aspects of CERCLA's liability structure is that a party
who is not directly responsible for polluting a site may be held
accountable for the cleanup.3
To complement its expansive liability provisions, CERCLA
provides the EPA with three powerful enforcement mecha-
nisms to respond to the release of hazardous materials. CER-
CLA authorizes the EPA to obtain a court injunction or issue
an administrative order compelling parties responsible for the
C.F.R. § 300.66(b)-(c) (1989). For NPL sites, the EPA will perform a remedial
investigation/feasibility study to ascertain the magnitude of the contamination
problem. See id. § 300.68(d); 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988).
19. See Carter Day Indus., Inc. v. United States EPA (In re Combustion
Equip. Assocs.), 838 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1988).
20. CERCLA's liability provision provides:
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise ar-
ranged for disposal or treatment... of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person,... at any facility ... owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,... from which there
is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State ....
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988) (defining the term "person").
22. Under CERCLA's joint and several liability framework, the EPA can
recover a substantial portion of its response cost by suing only a few finan-
cially viable parties. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-72
(4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985). Even though each defendant
may be held individually liable for all cleanup costs incurred at a facility,
courts have been receptive to allocating response costs among responsible par-
ties if the harm is divisible. See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d. at 172; United States
v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
23. See, e.g., L. De-Wayne Layfield, Note, CERCLA, Successor Liability
and the Federal Common Law: Responding to an Uncertain Legal Standard,
68 TEX. L. REV. 1237, 1246-50 (1990) (identifying cases where the courts have
been willing to interpret CERCLA broadly to find successor property owner's
liable for cleanup); Note, Cleaning up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender
Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest Exception, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1249,
1253-58 (1991) (identifying cases where lenders were held accountable for a
borrower's release of hazardous substances).
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
release to complete the cleanup.24 Alternatively, the EPA may
use "Superfund" money to decontaminate the site and then re-
cover its response costs from responsible parties.25 In some
cases, parties who undertake cleanup actions or reimburse the
EPA for its cleanup efforts may initiate contribution suits
against other responsible parties.26 Finally, CERCLA autho-
rizes the EPA to enter into settlement agreements which re-
lease responsible parties from future liability if they agree to
clean up hazardous substances.27 Except in extraordinary cir-
cumstances, however, the EPA cannot release a PRP from fu-
ture liability arising from conditions that were "unknown" at
the time the remedial action was taken. 28
Along with its unusually broad liability and enforcement
mechanisms, CERCLA contains two unique provisions to facili-
tate the EPA's cleanup efforts. First, the federal courts lack ju-
risdiction to review EPA actions29 until after the EPA initiates
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). The state and local governments and
private parties do not have the authority under CERCLA to order potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) to clean up hazardous substance releases. See
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1049-50. They must first effectuate part of the
cleanup and then seek recovery from the responsible party. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988) (parties liable for "costs of response incurred"); see also
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1155 (1st
Cir. 1989) (private party must incur response costs to recover under CER-
CLA's contribution provisions).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
26. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(f)(1) (1988). Section 113(f) pro-
vides that "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable" under CERCLA. Id. § 9613(f)(1); see also Steven B.
Russo, Contribution Under CERCLA. Judicial Treatment After SARA, 14
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 267, 278-85 (1989) (discussing cases considering CER-
CLA's contribution provisions).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 252 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3343. Along with releas-
ing PRPs from direct liability, the EPA also may release a responsible party
from liability for contribution and indemnification of other responsible parties.
42 U.S.C. § 9622(h)(4); see William W. Balcke, Note, Superfund Settlements:
The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REV. 123, 141-42 (1988).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A)-(B) (1988). Given this limitation, the EPA
has been reluctant to release responsible parties from subsequent liability
without a "reopener" provision allowing it to escape the release covenant if an
unforeseen hazard arises. See Backe, supra note 27, at 140-41.
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 to
make clear that it intended to create a system in which the government and
private parties would clean up environmental contamination first and litigate
liability later. See H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1986), re-
printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2863. In enacting CERCLA, Congress also
was concerned that requiring the EPA "to complete cleanups before it has ad-
equately assessed the site or before it knows how to perform a permanent
cleanup would make little environmental or economic sense, and would likely
[Vol. 76:327
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an enforcement action.30 Second, a party may be held responsi-
ble more than once for cleaning up pollution caused by a single
hazardous substance release. If the EPA subsequently detects
pollution that was unknown at the time of a PRP's original re-
sponse, the EPA is authorized to bring a second action against
that party.3 '
B. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Bankruptcy Code provides individuals and corpora-
tions with a means to obtain immediate relief from their in-
debtedness. As soon as a debtor petitions for bankruptcy, the
Code's automatic stay provision bars creditors with "claims"
that arose prior to the debtor's bankruptcy petition from seek-
ing repayment outside the bankruptcy proceedings.3 2 The
bankruptcy court, using a list of "debts" and "creditors"3 pre-
pared by the debtor,34 then notifiesas the identified creditors of
produce cleanups that are temporary, requiring further expenditures to cor-
rect those mistakes." Id at 56 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2838.
30. CERCLA states:
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law . . .or
under State law.., to review any challenges to removal or remedial
action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order
issued under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except one of
the following:.
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover re-
sponse costs ....
(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section
9606(a) of this title ....
(3) An action for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2) of
this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). Under this section, the courts, finding that pre-en-
forcement review would lead to considerable delays and increased cleanup
costs, have held that the EPA's action or inaction cannot be challenged prema-
turely. See, e.g., Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990); Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1387-88 (5th Cir. 1989).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (1988).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). Section 362(a)(6) provides that the filing of a
bankruptcy petitions stays "any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title." Id. § 362(a)(6) (emphasis added).
33. The Code defines "debt" to include any liability on a "claim." 11
U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988 & Supp. 1991). "Creditor" is defined as an "entity that
has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for
relief concerning the debtor." Id. § 101(10)(A) (emphasis added).
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1988) (requiring debtor to "file a list of credi-
tors, and unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and
liabilities").
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1988). Section 342(a) provides: "There shall be
given such notice as is appropriate, including notice to any holder of a commu-
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their right to assert a claim against the debtor's bankruptcy
estate.3 6
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,37 which preceded the
Code, creditors could assert only "provable" claims against the
bankrupt debtor.38 Many types of claims, including contingent
and unliquidated claims, often were not provable.3 9 Although
nity claim, of an order for relief in a case under this title." Id. Congress en-
acted § 342 to ensure that the due process rights of creditors, including the
federal and state regulatory agencies, were not violated. See H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 310, 331-32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6287-88; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5828.
36. A proof of claim against the debtor's estate "is deemed allowed" and
constitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim" un-
less a party in interest objects to the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988); BANKE.
R. 3003(b)(1). If a creditor objects to a filed claim, the dispute will be resolved
in an adversary proceeding in which the bankruptcy court determines whether
or not to allow the claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b); David Kauffman, Note, Pro-
cedures for Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in Bankruptcy, 35
STAN. L. REV. 153, 158-67 (1982).
37. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed 1978)) [hereinafter Bank-
ruptcy Act § xx, 11 U.S.C. § xx (1976)].
38. The 1898 Bankruptcy Act provided that the debtor's assets be distrib-
uted only to "allowed" claims. Bankruptcy Act § 57(d), 11 U.S.C. § 93(d)
(1976). Claims were not allowed unless they were provable. Id. § 63(d), 11
U.S.C. § 103(d) (1976); see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 502.01[1], at 502-8
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1991); BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. REs-
NICK, BANKRUPTCY LAw MANUAL 5.01 (3d ed. 1992).
39. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 specifically enumerated the classes of
debts that were provable and thus could be discharged in bankruptcy. Section
63 of the 1898 Act, entitled "Debts Which May Be Proved," narrowly defined
provable claims to include debts which were "a fixed liability, as evidenced by
a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition against him." Bankruptcy Act § 63(a), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(1976); see also 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 63.01[1], at 1756 (James W.
Moore ed., 14th ed. 1975). This language generally resulted in the exclusion of
tort and other noncontractual claims. See, e.g., 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra, I 63.25[1], at 1891; Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, Allowance
of Claims and Priorities Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 12 UCC L.J. 291,
291 (1982); Note, Tort Claims and the Bankrupt Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 475,
479-80 (1969).
Congress expanded the types of claims that were provable by enacting the
Chandler Act in 1938. The amended Bankruptcy Act allowed creditors hold-
ing "contingent debts" or "contingent contractual liabilities" to participate in
the distribution of the debtor's assets if the creditor had sued upon these
claims before the initiation of the debtor's bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act,
§ 63(a)(7)-(8), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(7)-(8) (1976). Consequently, the courts would
recognize a tort claim only if the right to recover was based on an action that
could be filed prior to and remain pending at the time of the bankruptcy. See
3A COLLIER, supra note 39, 63.29, at 1909; Timothy B. Matthews, The Scope
of Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 228-29 (1983).
[Vol. 76:327
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parties holding nonprovable rights were excluded in the distri-
bution of the debtor's assets, these creditors could assert their
claims once the debtor's bankruptcy was complete.40 Recogniz-
ing that the "provability" requirement impaired the debtor's
fresh start and treated creditors with similar claims differently,
Congress abolished this requirement in the Bankruptcy Code.41
In addition, to ensure that the courts would recognize certain
claims that the former Bankruptcy Act had not allowed,42 Con-
gress directed that the bankruptcy courts estimate all contin-
gent and unliquidated creditor claims. 43
The type of bankruptcy relief that the debtor seeks will
control the disposition of its assets. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
a trustee collects the debtor's property, converts the property to
cash,44 and uses the liquidation proceeds to pay the debtor's
creditors45 and the costs of administering the bankruptcy.46
40. See Bankruptcy Act § 17(a), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976) (discharge re-
leased a debtor from provable debts only); WEINTRAUB & RESNiCK, supra note
38, % 5.01; Matthews, supra note 39, at 224. In cases where the debtor was a
liquidating corporation, however, the creditor's claim became worthless be-
cause all that remained was an empty shell without assets. See id. at 229.
41. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code's legislative history explains:
H.R. 8200 abolishes the concept of provability in bankruptcy cases.
All claims against the debtor, whether or not contingent or unliqui-
dated, will be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.... [Under the prior
Act] certain creditors [were] not permitted to share in the estate be-
cause of the non-provable nature of their claims, and the debtor [was]
not discharged from those claims. Thus, relief for the debtor [was] in-
complete, and those creditors [were] not given an opportunity to col-
lect in the case on their claims. The proposed law will permit a
complete settlement of the affairs of a bankrupt debtor, and a com-
plete discharge and fresh start.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 35, at 180, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6141.
42. Prior to 1978, the court's ability to liquidate or estimate a claim was a
prerequisite to the claim's allowability. See Bankruptcy Act § 57(d), 11 U.S.C.
§ 93(d) (1976). If the obstacles to an expeditious liquidation or reasonable esti-
mation were insuperable, courts were justified in excluding otherwise contin-
gent or unliquidated claims. See 3 COLLIE, supra note 39, V 57.1512], at 250-51.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988). The legislative history associated with § 502
describes Congress's purpose in requiring the courts to estimate these claims:
"[Contingent or unmatured claims are to be liquidated by the bankruptcy
court in order to afford the debtor complete bankruptcy relief." H.R. REP. No.
595, supra note 35, at 352, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6308 (emphasis
added); see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 35, at 65, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5851.
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1988). Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 provide for
the distribution of assets to senior claimholders in full before any distribution
is made to more junior claimholders. See id. §§ 726(a), 1129(b).
46. Under both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11, "debts" which are "the actual,
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Unlike a Chapter 7 liquidation, a Chapter 11 reorganization
contemplates that the debtor will continue to operate its busi-
ness after the bankruptcy.47 The Chapter 11 debtor proposes a
reorganization plan,48 which the creditors must approve 49 and
the bankruptcy court must confirm,50 specifying how it will re-
pay its prebankruptcy debts.51
Once the Chapter 7 liquidation or the Chapter 11 confirma-
tion is complete, the debtor is given a fresh start. The Chapter
7 debtor is "discharged" of all liability on prebankruptcy
"claims. '52 Similarly, except for the prebankruptcy obligations
reaffirmed in the debtor's reorganization plan, the Chapter 11
debtor is discharged from all "claims" that arose before the
bankruptcy confirmation.53 Notwithstanding a discharge, the
debtor is fully liable for all "claims" arising after the Chapter 7
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate" are considered "admin-
istrative expenses." See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988); 3 COLLIER, supra note
38, 503.04[1][a][i]. Administrative expenses represent first priority claims in
the distribution of the debtor's assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). Several courts
have classified the EPA's cleanup claims as administrative expenses. See
Daniel Klerman, Earth First? CERCLA Reimbursement Claims and Bank-
ruptcy, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 795, 796 n.8 (1991) (identifying several cases where
courts have classified cleanup claims as administrative expenses).
47. Chapter l1's reorganization scheme exemplifies Congress's belief that
preserving a business entity that provides jobs, products, and services to the
community is preferable to liquidating it. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note
35, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 6179-80.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988); see 5 COLLIER, supra note 38, 1121.04, at
1121-8.
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a)-(g) (1988).
50. Before it can confirm a reorganization plan, the bankruptcy court
must determine that the plan provides equal treatment for creditors in the
same class, 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (1988), and that the proposed reorganization
is feasible. Id § 1129(a)(11). Feasibility requires that the debtor's reorganiza-
tion plan "present a workable scheme of organization and operation from
which there may be a reasonable expectation of success." 6A COLLIER, supra
note 39, 11.07, at 235.
51. Under the proposed reorganization plan, the debtor may continue to
operate the business to generate postbankruptcy income and pay off its
prebankruptcy debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) (1988).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988). A Chapter 7 liquidation "discharges the
debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the [bankruptcy petition.]"
Id (emphasis added). The Code exempts a few debts from discharge in Chap-
ter 7, including debts resulting from fraud, criminal fines and penalties, and
unlisted and unscheduled debts. Id& § 523(a)(2)-(4). A debtor's obligation to
clean up environmental contamination is not one of the listed discharge
exceptions.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988). Section 1141 provides that "the confirmation
of a plan... discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of
such confirmation." Id. (emphasis added).
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liquidation or the Chapter 11 confirmation.5
II. DETERMINING WHEN A BANKRUPTCY
CLAIM ARISES
Before considering when liability under CERCLA becomes
a bankruptcy claim, courts must determine whether the EPA's
rights qualify as a "claim." 55 If the EPA eliminates environ-
mental contamination and then seeks reimbursement for its ef-
forts, the EPA's rights clearly represent a "right to payment"
that can be discharged in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code
Section 101(5)(A).s6 A question arises, however, when the EPA
instead orders a PRP to clean up environmental contamination
it has caused.57 A PRP's duty to clean up hazardous substances
under an EPA injunctive order will qualify as a claim if the
54. Creditors may not want to file a proof of claim in order to avoid the
suggestion that they have waived their right to assert that no claim existed or
that the claim has not yet arisen. See Arlene E. Mirsky et al., The Interface
Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46 Bus. LAw. 623, 671 (1991).
However, if a creditor fails to file a proof of claim and its rights are deter-
mined to constitute a bankruptcy claim, the creditor's rights may be dis-
charged. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. Consequently, some
creditors have chosen to file a "protective" proof of claim in which they re-
serve the right to argue that no claim exists. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Chateaugay Corp., 88 B.R. 581, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
55. Section 101(5) of the Code defines "claim" as either a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced tojudgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contin-
gent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or
unsecuredL
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
56. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 283 (1985). The Kovacs Court hinted,
however, that a debtor may not always be discharged from the responsibility
to clean up environmental contamination: "[We do not hold that the injunc-
tion against bringing further toxic wastes on the premises or against any con-
duct that will contribute to the pollution of the site or the State's waters is
dischargeable in bankruptcy." Id. at 284-85.
57. United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988), was the first
major decision directly to consider whether an injunctive order, issued pursu-
ant to an environmental regulation and requiring a debtor in bankruptcy to
take action, was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Focusing on the Kovacs Court's
emphasis on the fact that the debtor in that case could not effectuate the
cleanup, the Whizco court held that if the debtor would be forced to spend
money to reclaim a coal mine it had previously abandoned, the obligation was
a dischargeable bankruptcy claim. Id. at 150-51. The Whizco court's expendi-
ture of money approach has been criticized. See, e.g., United States v. Hubler,
117 B.R. 160, 164 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1991); Linda Johannsen, Note, United States v.
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EPA has an alternative right to payment under Section
101(5)(B).- If the EPA's rights qualify as a claim,59 a court will
have to consider when the claim arose to determine if the
debtor's CERCLA liability is discharged. In making this deter-
mination, courts have adopted three inconsistent approaches.
A. ACCRUAL OF THE CREDITOR'S "RIGHT TO PAYMENT"
One approach for determining when a bankruptcy claim
arises focuses on when the creditor's "right to payment" comes
into existence. Recognizing that nonbankruptcy law deter-
mines whether the creditor's right represents a bankruptcy
Whizco, Inc.: A Further Refinement of the Conflict Between Bankruptcy Dis-
charge and Environmental Cleanup Obligations, 20 ENvTL. L. 207 (1990).
58. See 124 CONG. REc. H11,089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6437; 124 CONG. REc. S17,406
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6506.
59. The district court in United States v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re
Chateaugay Corp.), 112 B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), qff'd sub nom. United States
v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991), was the
first court to consider directly whether responsibility for undertaking environ-
mental cleanup pursuant to an EPA injunctive order would be discharged in
bankruptcy. The court, focusing on whether the creditor had the option of
converting an injunction into a right to monetary compensation in the event
the debtor failed to comply with the order, stated: "[Where a creditor has the
option of converting an injunction into a right to monetary compensation, as
the EPA can do here if it performs the cleanup because of a PRP's failure to do
so, such an obligation must be regarded as a dischargeable claim." Id. at 523
(emphasis added).
The Second Circuit, clarifying the district court's decision, reasoned that
an order directing the debtor to clean up wastes not "currently causing pollu-
tion" would qualify as a bankruptcy "claim" if the EPA had the option of do-
ing cleanup work itself and subsequently suing for the cleanup costs. United
States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d Cir. 1991).
The court stated:
[If EPA directs LTV to remove some wastes that are not currently
causing pollution, and if EPA could have itself incurred the costs of
removing such wastes and then sued LTV to recover the response
costs, such an order is a "claim" under the Cede. On the other hand,
if the order, no matter how phrased, requires LTV to take any action
that ends or ameliroates current pollution, such an order is not a
"claim."
... Since there is no option to accept payment in lieu of continued
pollution, any order that to any extent ends or ameliorates continued
pollution is not an order for breach of an obligation that gives rise to a
right of payment and is for that reason not a "claim."
Id. Finding that CERCLA provided the EPA with an option to perform an im-
mediate cleanup and that the hazardous substance at issue in the case was not
causing additional pollution, the Second Circuit held that the debtor's liability
under the EPA's cleanup order represented a "claim" and would be discharged
in the debtor's bankruptcy. Id. at 1008-09.
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claim, 60 courts following the right to payment approach reason
that nonbankruptcy law also should control when a bankruptcy
claim arises.61 Under this approach, the creditor's right does
not represent a claim subject to the Bankruptcy Code's auto-
matic stay or discharge provisions until the creditor's "right to
payment" has accrued under the applicable nonbankruptcy
law.62  I
60. See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156,
161 (1946) (holding that nonbankruptcy law dictates whether a right to pay-
ment is cognizable for bankruptcy purposes); see also Vern Countryman, The
Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407, 412 &
n.29 (1972) (explaining that the bankruptcy court must determine the debtor's
liability using nonbankruptcy law).
61. Outside the bankruptcy context, the issue of when a cause of action
arises or accrues occurs most frequently in determining the date from which a
statute of limitations begins to run. In cases in which injury is latent for some
time, the courts have taken two different approaches to determine when a
cause of action first accrues: exposure to the agent causing the injury, and dis-
covery of the injury. Under the exposure rule, the statute of limitations be-
gins to run at the point in time when the victim is exposed to the injury
causing agent. The absence of any manifestation of injury under this rule is
irrelevant. Conversely, the discovery rule, which has been adopted by a major-
ity of the states, provides that the statute of limitations begins to run once the
claimant knew or should have known of the injury caused by the defendant.
See Gregory A. Bibler, The Status of Unaccrued Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 61 AM. BANKIR L.J. 145, 164-68 (1987); Jennifer R.
Clarke, Note, Denial of a Remedy: Former Residents of Hazardous Waste
Sites and New York's Statute of Limitations, 8 COLUM J. ENVTL. L. 161, 170
n.55 (1982) (identifying 36 jurisdictions that have adopted the discovery rule).
Staying the running of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers
the injury ensures that the plaintiff's rights do not expire before the plaintiff
has an opportunity to assert them. Bibler, supra, at 164. Looking to substan-
tive nonbankruptcy law to determine when a bankruptcy claim arises would
have the same effect; creditors' rights would not be discharged before creditors
could assert them. Id. at 168.
62. One of the most recognized cases following the "right to payment" ap-
proach is Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744
F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985). In Frenville, a group
of banks that had made prebankruptcy loans to the Chapter 11 debtor sued
the debtor's certified public accountants, asserting negligent preparation of the
debtor's prebankruptcy financial statements. Id. at 333. The accounting firm
subsequently brought an indemnity suit against the debtor, alleging that the
debtor fraudulently provided incorrect financial information to the firm prior
to petitioning for bankruptcy. Id. at 337. In determining that the accounting
firm did not have a prepetition claim subject to the automatic stay, the Third
Circuit noted that under New York law the firm's right to payment for indem-
nification did not arise with the debtor's commission of the underlying fraudu-
lent act. Id. at 337-38. Under New York law, the accounting firm's "right to
payment" against its client did not arise until it was sued by the bank. Since
the bank did not sue until after the debtor's bankruptcy petition, the Frenville
court reasoned that a bankruptcy claim did not arise until postpetition. Id. at
337. The Third Circuit has continued to employ its Frenville "right to pay-
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The federal district court in United States v. Union Scrap
Iron & Metal 63 employed the "right to payment" approach to
determine when the debtor's CERCLA liability became a dis-
chargeable bankruptcy claim. The debtor, Taracorp Industries,
Inc., petitioned for bankruptcy in 1982. 64 In 1983, the State of
Minnesota detected hazardous wastes at a site at which
Taracorp had processed automobile batteries.65 Four years af-
ter Taracorp's reorganization plan was confirmed, the EPA
identified the company as a PRP.as Taracorp sought an order
establishing that its CERCLA liability previously was
discharged.6 7
The Union Scrap court rejected Taracorp's assertion that
the EPA's claim was discharged through bankruptcy because
the claim arose when the hazardous substances were released68
Instead, the court looked to CERCLA's statutory language to
ment" approach by looking to substantive nonbankruptcy law to determine
when a claim arises. See Lugo v. Paulsen, 886 F.2d 602, 607 (3rd Cir. 1989);
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 941-44 (3d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985). But see Kilbarr Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. (In
re Remington Rand Corp.), 836 F.2d 825, 832 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[A] party may
have a bankruptcy claim and not possess a cause of action on that claim.").
Several other courts have applied the Frenville court's right to payment
approach to determine when a bankruptcy claim arises. See, e.g., Al Tech Spe-
cialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 126 B.R.
919, 925 (W.D. Pa. 1991); In re Federal Press Co., 117 B.R. 942, 947 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1989); Orient River Invs., Inc. v. Equibank (In re Orient River Invs.,
Inc.), 105 B.R. 790, 795 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
63. 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
64. Id- at 833.
65. Id Prior to entering bankruptcy, Taracorp contracted with Union
Scrap Iron & Metal to process used automobile batteries. Id From 1979 to
1982, Union Scrap processed batteries for Taracorp. As of January 1983, ap-
proximately one year after Taracorp petitioned for bankruptcy, Union Scrap
still possessed batteries owned by Taracorp. Id
66. The bankruptcy court had set a July 5, 1983 deadline for the filing of
claims against Taracorp; it confirmed Taracorp's reorganization plan in July
1985. Id Although the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency detected contam-
ination at the Union Scrap site in 1983, the EPA did not begin its assessment
of the site until 1985 and its emergency removal action until 1988. Id In 1990,
the EPA concluded that the site required no further cleanup action. It then
sought to recover approximately $1,200,000 for the response costs it had in-
curred. Id, at 832.
67. Id. at 834. Taracorp did not acknowledge its potential CERCLA liabil-
ity at the Union Scrap site in its disclosure statement or plan of reorganiza-
tion. Id The EPA stated that it did not know that Taracorp had any relation
to the Union Scrap site until August 1989 and thus it did not "know of its po-
tential CERCLA claim against Taracorp until some years after Taracorp filed
for bankruptcy." Id
68. Id. at 838. Taracorp had argued that the EPA should have brought its
CERCLA claim before its reorganization plan was confirmed. The govern-
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determine when the debtor's obligation to clean up the contam-
ination arose. After identifying four elements that must be sat-
isfied before a CERCLA cause of action accrues,69 the court
held that the EPA did not have a dischargeable "right to pay-
ment" until it had expended funds in cleaning up the pollution
caused by the debtor.70 Because the EPA had not expended
funds before the conclusion of Taracorp's bankruptcy case, the
discharge did not relieve Taracorp of its CERCLA liability.
71
B. WHEN DID THE UNDERLYING ACTS OCCUR?
A majority of courts have criticized the right to payment
approach. These courts assert that substantive nonbankruptcy
law should determine only whether a creditor's rights are cogni-
zable in bankruptcy-not when a bankruptcy claim arises.72
Rather than looking to the substantive nonbankruptcy law,
ment countered that Taracorp's CERCLA liability arose after its reorganiza-
tion plan had been confirmed. I& at 834.
69. Id at 835. According to the court, the four elements are:
(1) there must be a facility; (2) there must be a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance at the facility; (3) there must be a
responsible person (as defined by the statute); and (4) the United
States must have incurred necessary costs in responding to the release
at the facility.
Id The court stated- "Because the EPA had incurred no response costs at the
time of Taracorp's confirmation, the EPA could have no claim in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings-there was no legal obligation under CERCLA." I& at
836.
70. Id The Union Scrap court relied in large part on the bankruptcy
court's decision in Jensen v. Bank of America (In re Jensen), 114 B.R. 700
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Jensen v. California Dep't of Health
Servs. (In re Jensen), 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991). See Union Scrap, 123
B.R. at 838. Looking to the language of CERCLA and California's environ-
mental laws, the bankruptcy court in Jensen found that two conditions must
exist before a bankruptcy claim arises: a release of hazardous waste and the
incurrence of cleanup costs. Jensen, 114 B.R. at 704.
The Union Scrap court also based its decision on Taracorp's failure to dis-
close its potential CERCLA liability during its previous bankruptcy reorgani-
zation proceedings and the EPA's lack of knowledge of the debtor's potential
CERCLA liability. See Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 833, 835-36.
71. Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 836.
72. See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Rus-
sell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988); Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg (In
re Grynberg), 113 B.R. 709, 712 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); Lovett v. Honeywell,
Inc. (In re Transportation Sys. Int'l., Inc.), 110 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Erti v. Paine Webber Jackson
& Curtis, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.), 765 F.2d 343, 348 n.4 (2d Cir.
1985) (expressing doubts about the Third Circuit's Frenville decision); Ralph
A. Mabey & Annette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville" A Critique by the National
Bankruptcy Conference's Committee on Claims and Distributions, 42 Bus.
LAw. 697, 703-05 (1987) (criticizing Frenville reasoning).
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courts following this approach focus on when the "underlying
act" giving rise to the claim occurred.73 If the acts resulting in
the creditor's claim precede the debtor's bankruptcy, these
courts have held that the creditor's right represents a prebank-
ruptcy "claim" subject to the Code's automatic stay and dis-
charge provisions.7 4
In re Jensen7 5 illustrates how courts have applied the "un-
derlying act" approach to determine when CERCLA liability
becomes a dischargeable bankruptcy claim. The debtors, Mr.
and Mrs. Jensen, owned and operated a lumber company which
released toxins into the groundwater before they petitioned for
bankruptcy.76 Two years after their bankruptcy case was
closed, the State of California informed the Jensens that they
were potentially liable for the cleanup on the lumber company
site.7 7 The Jensens filed an action to determine whether their
CERCLA liability had been discharged previously.78
The Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel rejected
the California pollution agency's argument that it did not have
73. Under this approach, the "triggering act which constitutes the basis
for the cause of action must have occurred prior to filing the petition in bank-
ruptcy." In re Grynberg, 113 B.R. at 713.
74. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir.), cert dismissed
sub nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co., 487 U.S. 1260 (1988), was one of the first
federal appellate decisions to expressly reject the Frenville "right to payment"
approach. It is also the case most often cited for the proposition that the tim-
ing of the underlying acts giving rise to a cause of action controls when a
bankruptcy claim arises. In Grady, the claimant used a Dalkon Shield contra-
ceptive device, manufactured and marketed by the debtor, prior to the debtor's
bankruptcy. Id. at 199. The plaintiff did not discover her injuries until after
the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Id. A.H. Robins asserted that the bankruptcy
claim arose with the use of the contraceptive; the plaintiff, however, argued
that her claim did not arise until she detected her injuries. Id at 201. Re-
jecting the plaintiff's argument, the Fourth Circuit focused on the underlying
acts that gave rise to her claim. Id. at 203. The court held that the plaintiff's
right to recover became a claim subject to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic
stay provision when the intrauterine device was inserted. Id.
75. Jensen v. California Dep't of Health Servs. (In re Jensen), 127 B.R. 27
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), revg Jensen v. Bank of America (In re Jensen), 114
B.R. 700 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990).
76. Jensen, 114 B.R. at 701. On February 2, 1984, the California Regula-
tory Water Quality Control Board discovered hazardous substances on the
lumber site property. Id On February 13, 1984, the Jensens filed a Chapter 7
petition. Id.
77. Id. Their debts were discharged and their bankruptcy case closed in
February 1985. In March of 1987, California informed the Jensens that they
were considered PRPs and might be held personally liable for the cleanup
costs at the lumber site they formerly owned. Id.
78. Id. at 702.
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a claim capable of discharge until it expended response costs.7 9
Noting that the substance release occurred prior to the debtor's
petition for bankruptcy, the court held that the cleanup liabil-
ity arose prepetition and therefore was discharged.8 0
C. WHEN DID THE "DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP" ARISE?
The third approach courts have adopted to determine when
a bankruptcy claim arises, the "debtor-creditor relationship"
approach, is functionally an offshoot of the "underlying acts"
approach. Courts following this approach, like the courts em-
ploying the underlying acts approach, 8 ' consider when the acts
resulting in the claim occurred. If the acts giving rise to the
right to payment occurred prepetition, these courts consider
whether a prebankruptcy relationship existed between the
debtor and the party asserting the claim.8 2 Any liability arising
after the parties began a relationship is discharged.8 3
79. 127 B.R. at 33. This was the bankruptcy court's holding. 114 B.R. at
706.
80. The court, in effect, followed the district court's holding in United
States v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 112 B.R. 513, 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991), that for purposes of discharge a bankruptcy
claim arises upon the debtor's release of hazardous substances into the envi-
ronment. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 32-33. The court believed that this result carried
out the fresh start goal of bankruptcy and effectively discouraged manipula-
tion of the bankruptcy process. I& at 33.
81. See supra part H.B; infra note 124.
82. The rationale behind this approach is that a creditor should not be
forced to anticipate its potential claims against the debtor in bankruptcy
before a relationship exists. See Pettibone Corp. v. Ramirez (In re Pettibone
Corp.), 90 B.R. 918, 931-33 (Bankr. N.D. M. 1988). This standard may shield
claims from discharge which have their genesis in prepetition activity if no
prebankruptcy relationship existed. Id at 933-34.
83. Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986), is
the case most often cited by courts applying the debtor-creditor relationship
approach. In Edge, two dentists negligently treated a patient. Id, at 691. The
creditor-patient did not discover her injuries until after the dentists had en-
tered bankruptcy. Id. The creditor-patient, attempting to avoid the Bank-
ruptcy Code's automatic stay and recover for the negligent treatment, sought a
court declaration that her claim did not arise until she discovered her injury.
Id The federal district court denied the patient's request and held that, for
the purposes of the automatic stay, a bankruptcy claim arose at the earliest
point in the relationship between the victim and the wrongdoer, in this case
when the patient-creditor visited the dentist and the dentist performed the
negligent act. I&. at 699.
Other courts have required the existence of a relationship before declar-
ing that a bankruptcy claim exists. See, e.g., Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.) (To a have contingent claim, "one must have
a legal relationship relevant to the purported interest from which that interest
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The Second Circuit's decision in In re Chateaugays4 exem-
plifies the use of the relationship approach in the CERCLA set-
ting. The government detected hazardous substances on the
debtor's property while the debtor was in the midst of negotiat-
ing a reorganization plan.8 5 The EPA sought a declaratory
judgment that the debtor's liability for future cleanup costs
would not be discharged with the confirmation of the debtor's
reorganization plan.86
The court first determined that the debtor released hazard-
ous substances into the environment prior to entering bank-
ruptcy.8 7 Next, the Second Circuit considered the relationship
between the debtor and the EPA to assess whether the EPA
reasonably could anticipate future CERCLA claims against the
debtor.8 8 Although it acknowledged that the EPA did not
know the location of all the contaminated sites owned by the
debtor or the extent of the removal action that would be re-
quired at each site,89 the court explained: "The relationship be-
tween environmental regulating agencies and those subject to
regulation provides sufficient 'contemplation' of contingencies
to bring most ultimately maturing payment obligations based
may flow."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg
(In re Grynberg), 113 B.R. 709, 713 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (bankruptcy claim
premised on "some direct prepetition privity" between the debtor and credi-
tor); Pettibone, 90 B.R. at 931-33.
84. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d.
Cir. 1991), affg United States v. Chateugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
112 B.R. 513 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
85. Id at 999.
86. The EPA had argued that the debtor's liability under CERCLA and
similar state environmental laws, and therefore the existence of a bankruptcy
claim, arose only after it had either incurred response costs or ordered a PRP
to perform the cleanup. Id at 1000.
87. I& at 1003-04. Along with a determination of the debtor's future lia-
bility, the EPA sought recovery of response costs it had incurred prior to the
debtor's petition for bankruptcy. Id Consequently, there was no question that
the hazardous substance release occurred prepetition.
88. Id at 1003-05. The court stated:
Though there does not yet exist between EPA and LTV the degree of
relationship between the claimant and debtor typical of an existing
though unmatured contract claim, the relationship is far closer than
that existing between future tort claimants totally unaware of injury
and a tort-feasor.
Id at 1005.
89. Id The court stated: "[Tihe location of these sites, the determination
of their coverage by CERCLA, and the incurring of response costs by EPA are
all steps that may fairly be viewed, in the regulatory context, as rendering
EPA's claim 'contingent,' rather than as placing it outside the Code's definition
of 'claim.'" Id. at 1005.
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on prepetition conduct within the definition of 'claims.' "90 The
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that all lia-
bility associated with prepetition releases of hazardous sub-
stances would be discharged in the debtor's bankruptcy.9 1
III. UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS UNDER THE
EXISTING APPROACHES
A. UNDERMINING THE CODE'S LANGUAGE AND PURPOSES VIA
THE "RIGHT TO PAYMENT" APPROACH
The "right to payment" approach used by the court in
United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal9 2 disregards the
Bankruptcy Code's language and purposes. Prior to Congress's
repeal of the provability requirement, courts were required to
consider nonbankruptcy law to determine when a claim arose.
Unless the creditor possessing a tort or other noncontractual
claim could obtain a judgment under the applicable nonban-
kruptcy law, the creditor did not have a provable bankruptcy
claim.9 3 Requiring the courts to look at CERCLA's language to
ascertain whether the EPA has a bankruptcy claim would, in
effect, reinstate provability.94 Abolition of the provability re-
quirement strongly suggests that nonbankruptcy law should no
longer be dispositive of when a bankruptcy claim arises.9 5
90. Id
91. Id at 1006. In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit noted that
its holding, though focusing on prepetition conduct, "did not go so far as to in-
clude CERCLA response costs attributable to any action of the debtor that oc-
curred prepetition" within the definition of a bankruptcy claim. Id at 1005.
The court stated that the prepetition "construction of a storage facility" that
leaked hazardous substances would not suffice as the prepetition conduct
needed for a claim to exist. Id If the court had applied the pure "underlying
acts" approach the debtor would have been discharged of CERCLA liability to
the extent that its prebankruptcy conduct or acts resulted in either a pre- or
postbankruptcy release of hazardous substances. See supra part II.B.
92. 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
93. See supra note 39.
94. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986) ("Adherence to [the Frenville "right to payment" approach] would rein-
stitute the provability concept of claims, which the drafters of the Code specif-
ically intended to abolish.").
95. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Section 157(d) requires that
the district court, on timely motion from a party, withdraw all or part of a case
from a bankruptcy court "if the court determines that resolution of the pro-
ceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United
States .. .affecting interstate commerce." 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988). Several
district courts, considering a motion to withdraw reference, have held that
withdrawal is mandatory when the bankruptcy court is asked to consider
when a CERCLA claim arises. These courts have found that a determination
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The Bankruptcy Code's broad definition of "claim" also im-
plies that nonbankruptcy law, like CERCLA, should not con-
trol when a bankruptcy claim arises. "Claim" encompasses any
right to payment, no matter how remote or contingent.96 The
terms "unliquidated," "unmatured," and "contingent" in the
Code's definition of "claim" broaden the scope of the term
"right to payment. ' 97 By using this language, Congress in-
tended to expand, not qualify, the scope of "claim" beyond a
right to payment under nonbankruptcy law.98 Thus, even
of when a CERCLA bankruptcy claim arises would require the bankruptcy
court to consider and interpret CERCLA. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Chateaugay Corp., 88 B.R. 581, 584-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (because the issue of
when CERCLA claim arose would require analysis of competing policies of
CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code, mandatory withdrawal is required);
United States v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 63 B.R.
600, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (a determination of whether claims against debtor oc-
curred before or after debtor entered bankruptcy would require interpretation
of CERCLA); Carter Day Indus., Inc. v. United States EPA (In re Combustion
Equip. Assocs.), 67 B.R. 709, 712-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same), aff'd on other
grounds, 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988). Looking to CERCLA's language to deter-
mine when a CERCLA bankruptcy claim arises is inconsistent with the posi-
tion taken by a majority of the courts outside the "withdrawal of reference"
context. Courts following the underlying acts approach consistently have held
that substantive nonbankruptcy law does not control when a bankruptcy claim
arises. See supra part II.B.
96. The Bankruptcy Code does not define "right to payment." The House
and Senate reports, however, discussing the Code's expanded definition of
"claim," indicate that the Code
adopts an even broader definition of claim than is found in the pres-
ent debtor rehabilitation chapters.... By this broadest possible defi-
nition, and by the use of the term throughout title 11 .... the bill
contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how
remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy
case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 35, at 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6266 (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 35, at 21-22, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5807-08 (emphasis added).
97. See supra note 55; see also Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct.
2150, 2155-56 (1991) (after reviewing the Bankruptcy Code, legislative history,
and case law, the Court reiterated that "claim" is defined extremely broadly);
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2130 (1990)
(noting that Congress intended to create a "broad rather than restrictive view
of the class of obligations that qualify as a 'claim' giving rise to a 'debt' "); Ohio
v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 (1985) (indicating that the term "claim" should be
construed broadly). Collier's editors predict that after Davenport and Johnson
the courts will "rebuff virtually all attempts to characterize obligations as
outside the scope of the definition [of "claim"] due to 'special' or unique char-
acteristics of those obligations." 2 COLLIER, supra note 38, % 101.05, at 101-30.
98. Several courts have found that a bankruptcy claim may exist before a
cause of action under the applicable substantive nonbankruptcy law. See, e.g.,
Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg (In re Grynberg), 113 B.R. 709, 713 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990); Shipwrights, Joiners & Caulkers Local 2071 v. Uniflite, Inc. (In re
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though a court rationally could find that no "right to payment"
exists under CERCLA until ihe EPA has detected the sub-
stance release, expended funds, or completed cleanup, the
Code's expansive definition of ;"claim" suggests that CERCLA
liability may become a bankruptcy claim much earlier.
The idea that a bankruptcy claim may arise before a right
to payment exists under CERCLA also comports with the
Bankruptcy Code's requirement that bankruptcy courts esti-
mate and discharge unliquidated and contingent claims. 9
Although Congress did not define "contingent" in the Code,
courts generally have found that a contingency for bankruptcy
purposes exists when the liability-triggering event was "reason-
ably contemplated by the debtor and creditor at the time the
event giving rise to the claim occurred."10 0 This definition indi-
cates that a right to payment must be foreseeable before it can
be considered a contingent claim. Although liability under
CERCLA may become foreseeable much earlier, a debtor's fu-
ture cleanup obligation unquestionably is foreseeable once the
EPA detects contamination and identifies the debtor as a PRP.
Once the debtor's obligation is foreseeable, it represents a con-
tingent debt that the bankruptcy courts should estimate and
discharge, regardless of when a right to payment accrues under
CERCLA.10
Murray Indus., Inc.), 110 Bankr. 585, 588 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); see also
supra part H.B. (collecting cases criticizing the "right to payment" approach).
99. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
100. In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1980) (emphasis added), cqff'd per curiam sub nom. All Media Properties, Inc.
v. Best (In re All Media Properties, Inc.), 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981). The All
Media court explained: "A claim is contingent as to liability if the debtor's
legal duty to pay does not come into existence until triggered by the occur-
rence of a future event and such future occurrence was within the actual or
presumed contemplation of the parties at the time the original relationship of
the parties was created." Id. (emphasis added).
101. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. The definition of "claim" is
the same in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases. See supra note 55 (providing
the definition of "claim" that applies to the entire Code). In a Chapter 7 liqui-
dation, all liabilities based upon the debtor's prepetition conduct would need to
be treated as prepetition claims. If claims resulting from prebankruptcy acts
were treated as postbankruptcy claims, those claimants would receive nothing,
no matter what their legal priority. See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re
Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d. Cir. 1991); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co.,
839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir.), cert dismissed sub nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co.,
487 U.S. 1260 (1988); Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 699-700 n.8
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986). Consequently, if the debtor is a liquidating corpora-
tion, the EPA must assert that it has a prepetition claim if it is to receive com-
pensation from the PRP's estate, because the entity effectively will cease to
exist and the EPA would receive nothing after the PRP's bankruptcy.
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Another fundamental weakness in the right to payment
approach is that it may undermine the debtor's fresh start. A
cause of action under CERCLA may not accrue until the EPA
detects the release of hazardous substances, expends cleanup
funds, or completes the entire cleanup.10 2 These events may
not transpire until years after the debtor's bankruptcy case con-
cludes, even though the EPA could foresee, and the court could
estimate, the debtor's liability much earlier. Delaying a
debtor's discharge for prepetition pollution until a cause of ac-
tion under CERCLA accrues will inhibit both a Chapter 7
debtor's ability to start anew 0 3 and the Chapter 11 debtor's
ability to reorganize. 0 4
102. CERCLA's language is contradictory on exactly when a right to pay-
ment for environmental cleanup first arises. The EPA is empowered to take
action as soon as there is a release or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). This suggests that a cause of action
arises at that time. Notwithstanding this provision, the word "incurred" in
§ 9607(a) suggests that a right to payment may not arise until the government
or a private party has undertaken a cleanup action. I&i § 9607(a). Similarly,
CERCLA's statute of limitations begins to run at the "completion of the re-
moval action," id § 9613(g)(2)(A), suggesting that cleanup efforts trigger a
cause of action under CERCLA.
103. Moreover, a delay in the debtor's liquidation risks the deterioration of
the value of the debtor and thus, a concomitant decrease in the value of pay-
ments to claimants. See Kauffman, supra note 36, at 159.
104. Professor Roe has summarized the potential ramifications of the
delayed reorganization of a bankrupt debtor plagued by contingent liabilities:
Access to capital markets will be reduced. The enterprise will shrink
.... Worthwhile projects will be foregone. Stockholders will be mo-
tivated to march the firm down risky paths. Customers and suppliers
will flee. Mergers will be barred; management, no longer fearful of
ouster by merger, might slacken its performance. To the extent it
performs, it must donate its time and energy to the resolution of the
firms's financial troubles, not to operations.
Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 846, 855 (1984);
see also Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1420-21 (1985) (arguing that owners and managers of an
enterprise unable to escape or ascertain their future liability may reduce their
productive contribution).
These problems undoubtedly will exist and most likely be more severe
when a bankrupt debtor is subjected to protracted CERCLA liability. If the
uncertainty surrounding the debtor's CERCLA liability has not dissipated,
purchasers, equity investors and lenders may fear being held personally liable
for the debtor's preexisting CERCLA obligations. See supra notes 20-23 and
accompanying text.
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B. DISREGARDING THE CODE'S DISCHARGE LIMITATIONS AND
CERCLA'S OBJECTIVES VIA THE "UNDERLYING ACTS"
APPROACH
The "underlying acts" approach adopted in In re Jensen
fails to address adequately the Bankruptcy Code's limitations
and CERCLA's objectives. Many of the courts that have em-
ployed the "underlying acts" approach have addressed the issue
of when a bankruptcy claim arises in the context of applying
the Bankruptcy Code's "automatic stay" provision.-05 This pro-
vision will not be an issue unless the creditor is aware of its
rights against the debtor prior to the completion of the debtor's
bankruptcy proceedings. 06 Thus, courts employing the under-
lying acts analysis in the automatic stay context have no reason
to consider whether the creditor was aware of or could antici-
pate its future claim.10 7 In a discharge action, however, the
debtor may commence and complete its bankruptcy proceed-
ings before the EPA, as a creditor, is aware of its claim. De-
spite Congress's repeal of the "provability" requirement and its
broad definition of "claim," nothing in the legislative history or
the Code suggests that Congress intended to discharge a credi-
tor's rights before the creditor knew or should have known that
its rights existed.'0 8
105. See, e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir.), cert
dismissed sub non Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co., 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 686-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also
Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 691 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (apply-
ing the relationship approach).
106. The automatic stay continues until the debtor's bankruptcy case is
closed or dismissed or until the court grants the debtor a discharge. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(c) (1988); see 2 COLLIER, supra note 38, 362.06, at 362-54 to 362-55. Con-
sequently, a creditor's claims will not be affected by the automatic stay after
the debtor's bankruptcy is complete.
107. Moreover, when courts apply the automatic stay provision broadly and
bar a creditor from pursuing its rights against a bankrupt debtor, the creditor
is only temporarily deprived of its rights because once it has filed a claim, the
creditor will be entitled to recover in the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings. See
WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 38, 1 1.09[1]. Application of the Code's dis-
charge provisions, on the other hand, permanently azd completely affects the
creditor's ability to collect its claim. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying
text.
108. Although Congress intended to define "claim" broadly, see supra note
96, the legislative history accompanying the enactment of the Code states:
"Creditor" ... encompasses certain holders of claims that are deemed
to arise before the date of the filing of the petition, such as those in-
jured by the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease
.... A guarantor of or a surety for a claim against the debtor will
also be a creditor, because he will hold a contingent claim against the
1991]
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The EPA's right to notice under the Fifth Amendment also
may limit the bankruptcy court's ability to discharge CERCLA
liability.10 9 The bankruptcy court uses a list of creditors pre-
pared by the debtor to notify creditors of their right to assert
claims against the debtor's estate.110 The debtor is unlikely to
identify the government as a creditor if it is not aware of its lia-
bility for the release of hazardous substances.1 Even if the
EPA is given notice, the notice may not be constitutionally suf-
ficient if the government is not made aware of the details of its
potential claim.11 2
debtor that will become fixed when he pays the creditor whose claim
he has guaranteed or insured.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 35, at 310, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6266-67; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 35, at 22, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5808. In each example provided by Congress, the right to payment would be
determined by a prebankruptcy contractual arrangement which would enable
parties to anticipate the consequences of a breach. See Kilbarr Corp. v. Gen-
eral Servs. Admin. (In re Remington Rand Corp.), 836 F.2d 825, 829, 832-33 (3d
Cir. 1988).
109. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950),
the Supreme Court considered whether certain state law notice provisions sat-
isfied the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 314.
The Court first applied its Mullane analysis in the bankruptcy context in City
of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953). The Court held
that notice by publication was inadequate to inform a creditor who was aware
of the debtor's bankruptcy. Id. at 296. The Court stated that "even creditors
who have knowledge of a reorganization have a right to assume that the statu-
tory 'reasonable notice' will be given them before their claims are forever
barred." Id. at 297; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1988) (debts "neither listed
nor scheduled" are not discharged "unless such creditor had notice or actual
knowledge of the case in time" to file a proof of claim); 5 COLLIER, supra note
38, 1 1141.01[b], at 1141-13 to 1141-14 (discussing due process constraints under
Chapter 11). Several courts, relying on Mullane and City of New York, have
held that actual notice to creditors is required in cases where the debtor had
actual knowledge of the creditor's claim. See, e.g., Broomall Indus., Inc. v.
Data Design Logic Sys., Inc., 786 F.2d 401, 403 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Chicago,
R.I. & P.R.R. Co., 788 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986).
110. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
111. Similarly, if creditors have no idea that they have a claim against the
debtor, they will not file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court.
112. "[R]easonable notice is that which is reasonably calculated to reach all
interested parties, reasonably conveys all of the required information, and per-
mits a reasonable amount of time for response." Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon &
Co. v. Bullock (In re Robintech, Inc.), 863 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir.) (citing Mul-
lane, 339 U.S. at 314), cert denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989). In United States v.
LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991), the court
noted: "The debtor's schedule of liabilities included 24 pages of claims, labeled
'contingent,' that were held by EPA and the environmental enforcement of-
ficers of all fifty states and the District of Columbia. The schedule provided
no details concerning these claims." Id, at 999. Given this limited information,
it is unrealistic to expect the EPA, when it has had no prebankruptcy contact
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Notwithstanding the sufficiency of notice, discharging lia-
bility solely because a release of hazardous substances occurred
pre-petition may conflict with CERCLA's goal of cleaning up
the environment quickly.11 3 Even if the EPA detects the re-
lease of hazardous substances prior to the completion of the
debtor's bankruptcy, under the underlying acts approach it
would need to determine prematurely whether the debtor is a
responsible party and file a proof of claim to participate in the
debtor's bankruptcy. This could require the EPA to divert its
energies from, and thus delay, the cleaning up of the most se-
verely polluted sites. In addition, if the amount or allowability
of the EPA's claim is challenged by other creditors, the bank-
ruptcy court will be required to conduct an adversary proceed-
ing to resolve these issues.11 4 CERCLA, however, deprives the
federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, of jurisdiction to
review the EPA's pre-enforcement actions.115 Allowing the
courts to control the priority of the EPA's response as well as
the scope and magnitude of the debtor's CERCLA liability
could undermine CERCLA's goal of expeditiously and effec-
tively cleaning up the environment.
116
with the debtor, to assess the value of its claim effectively and completely. In
addition, the more times the EPA is identified as a contingent creditor, the
more it will need detailed information about the debtor's prebankruptcy activi-
ties and use of hazardous substances to avoid expending its limited resources
and time investigating companies and individuals entering bankruptcy rather
than pursuing cleanup and enforcement actions.
113. See supra notes 29-30.
114. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
116. The Second Circuit rejected this argument in Chateaugay. The EPA
had argued that "it 'would be forced to litigate in the bankruptcy proceedings
to liquidate and fix any claims it might conceivably have against [LTV] for
post-confirmation response costs' at numerous sites" and that the "estimation
process would 'embroil the parties and the bankruptcy court in disputes over
the wisdom and scope of possible remedies."' Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1006
(quoting Brief for United States at 42). Finding that estimation would not of-
fend CERCLA's objectives, the Second Circuit stated that the court could
make a "speedy and rough estimation of CERCLA claims for purposes of de-
termining EPA's voice in the Chapter 11 proceedings, with ultimate liquida-
tion of the claims to await the outcome of normal CERCLA enforcement
proceedings in which EPA will be entitled to collect its allowable share." Id
The Second Circuit's reasoning undermines CERCLA's goals of quick and ef-
fective cleanup because it would force the EPA "to respond to countless bank-
ruptcy proceedings involving yet unknown environmental dangers and
liabilities" whenever "a conceivable PRP entered bankruptcy." See United
States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 834 (D. Minn. 1990); see also
supra notes 29-30 (discussing Congress's rationale for denying courts pre-en-
forcement review of EPA actions).
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Allowing debtors to escape their CERCLA liability solely
on the basis of when contamination occurred also may hinder
the EPA's ability to negotiate a settlement agreement in which
the debtor agrees to complete hazardous waste cleanup. Be-
cause delays in entering bankruptcy could saddle the debtor
with more responsibility to pay for cleanup out of its preban-
kruptcy assets and postbankruptcy earnings, the debtor will
have an incentive to enter bankruptcy immediately after it is
identified as a responsible party. The sooner the debtor enters
bankruptcy after a release has occurred, the less likely the
EPA is to detect the contamination, identify the debtor as a
PRP, and negotiate a settlement agreement. Moreover, EPA
settlement agreements typically release parties only from lia-
bility that is known at the time the parties entered into the
agreement.117 If the debtor can escape both known and un-
known liability by entering into bankruptcy, it has no incentive
to settle with the EPA. This, along with a PRP's immediate en-
try into bankruptcy, may delay cleanup.118
Along with delaying cleanup, requiring the bankruptcy
court to estimate all liabilities associated with an entity's pre-
bankruptcy activities solely on the basis of a prepetition release
represents a formidable if not insurmountable task." 9 Without
evidence that the debtor is directly responsible for a hazardous
substance release or that the debtor has engaged in activities
that may expose it to liability under CERCLA, a court may be
unwilling to give any value to the EPA's claim.'20 Even courts
117. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
118. See 131 CONG. REC. S12,021 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Specter) ("[E]ncouraging settlement . . . will expedite environmental
cleanup."); Balcke, supra note 27, at 134 (observing that settlements may expe-
dite cleanups because the private sector is better equipped to take action
quickly and inexpensively).
119. Collier's editors explain the burden the Bankruptcy Code places on
the courts:
The problem of contingent claims in bankruptcy is ... the question
whether or not the bankruptcy court will deem liquidation or estima-
tion of the claim reasonably feasible, a question .. . whose solution
will ultimately rest upon the exercise of judicial discretion in light of
the circumstances of the case, particularly the probable duration of
the process of liquidation as compared with the period of future un-
certainty due to the contingency in question.
3A COLLIER, supra note 39, 1 63.30, at 1912.
120. See Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273, 278 (1931) (stating that a contin-
gent bankruptcy claim may be so speculative that valuation is impossible; in
such cases, the claim will be rejected); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
758 F.2d 936, 941-43 (3d Cir.) ("Proof of damages absent manifest injury would
be highly speculative."), cert denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); cf. Braswell v.
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that are willing to value contingent CERCLA claims are likely
to undervalue the claims until the debtor's liability is foresee-
able. Undervaluing the amount the EPA is allowed to recover
on its CERCLA claims will decrease the agency's resources and
may delay or even prevent environmental cleanup.
C. PROBLEMS WITH THE "RELATIoNsHn" APPROACH
The Second Circuit in In re Ohateaugay determined that
the EPA's authority to regulate and police environmental mat-
ters was sufficient to establish a relationship from which the
EPA should be able to anticipate its future cleanup claims
against the debtor. 12' By broadly defining the relationship, the
court undermined the rationale for considering whether or not
a relationship exists-that a creditor with a relationship may
anticipate its potential claim.122 All claims arising after this
debtor-creditor relationship is known to exist, even those that
are not within the creditor's contemplation, will be dis-
chargedm23 When courts fail to limit the scope of the relation-
ship to situations where some prepetition interaction between
the PRP and the EPA existed, this expansive relationship ap-
proach takes on the characteristics of and thus suffers from the
same infirmities as the "underlying acts" approach2 4
Flintkote Mines Ltd., 723 F.2d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1983) (Swygert, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a tort victim who brings an action for immediate recovery before
the injury is manifested or even discoverable would be "laughed out of court"),
cert denied, 467 U.S. 1231 (1984).
121. See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997,
1003-05 (2d Cir. 1991). In many instances, however, interaction between the
EPA and PRP usually will not occur until some point after a release of a haz-
ardous substance has occurred. In Jensen, for example, the bankruptcy court
recognized that California "did not even know of the debtors" until after they
had filed for bankruptcy. Jensen v. Bank of America (In re Jensen), 114 B.R.
700, 703 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Jensen v. California Dep't of
Health Servs. (In re Jensen), 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
122. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
124. See supra part MI.B. It is interesting to note that in most of the cases
cited by the courts for the proposition that the timing of the underlying event
giving rise to the claim should control when a claim arises, some prepetition
relationship existed between the debtor and the creditor. See Ohio v. Kovacs,
469 U.S. 274, 275-76 (1985) (the State brought suit against Kovacs before he en-
tered bankruptcy); In re A.H. Robins Co., 63 B.R. 986, 987, 993-94 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1986) (injured creditor had purchased and used debtor's contraceptive
product before bankruptcy commenced), qff'd sub nom. Grady v. A.H. Robins
Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.), cert dismissed sub nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co.,
487 U.S. 1260 (1988); Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 691 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1986) (creditor-patient, asserting negligence claim, was injured during
visit to dentist); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 681-82 (Bankr.
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IV. WHEN SHOULD CERCLA LIABILITY BECOME A
BANKRUPTCY CLAIM?
A. FORESEEABILITY AS A SOLUTION
There are two contexts in which courts will be required to
determine when CERCLA liability becomes a dischargeable
bankruptcy "claim." In some situations, courts will be asked to
determine the dischargeability of the debtor's liability before
the completion of the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings.125 In
other situations, however, the EPA will not detect contamina-
tion until the conclusion of the debtor's bankruptcy case.
These courts may be required to make this determination years
after the conclusion of the debtor's bankruptcy case. 26 In both
of these contexts, courts should discharge only the CERCLA li-
ability which is or was foreseeable at the conclusion of the
debtor's bankruptcy case. 2 7
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (injured creditors purchased debtor's product containing asbes-
tos before the commencement of bankruptcy).
125. See supra parts II.B. and II.C. (discussing Jensen v. California Dep't of
Health Servs. (In re Jensen), 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) and United
States v. LTV (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991)).
126. See supra part II.A. (discussing United States v. Union Scrap Iron &
Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990)).
127. Much like the asbestos cases of the 1980s, the conflicts associated with
determining when a CERCLA claim first arises are deep enough that no per-
fect solution is available. In 1989, the National Bankruptcy Conference, a pri-
vate group of lawyers and practitioners who were instrumental in the drafting
of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, considered proposing an amendment to the
Cede's definition of "claim." The revised definition would have read:
"claim" means-
(A) right to payment, whenever arising, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or
unsecured, and whether or not the entity holding such claim knows or
has reason to know-
(i) of the act or failure to act giving rise to such right to pay-
ment; or
(ii) that such entity could foreseeably assert liability with respect
to such act or failure to act.
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERI-
ALs ON BANKRUPTCY 157 (2d ed. 1990). Under this proposal, it is clear that all
claims which had their genesis in prebankruptcy conduct would be discharged
irrespective of whether the creditor was aware of its rights. In the absence of
an overhaul of the definition of claim or some other legislation resolving the
scope of dischargeable claims, the courts must compromise on the competing
considerations of the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA. See Roe, supra note
104, at 849.
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1. Detecting Contamination Before the Debtor's Bankruptcy
Even if the EPA detects pollution before the PRP's bank-
ruptcy case is complete, the agency may be unable to complete
the cleanup of the hazardous substances before the debtor's es-
tate is liquidated or a reorganization plan is confirmed.18 In
this situation, the bankruptcy court should give the EPA time
128. On November 5, 1991, the federal district court in Sylvester Brothers
Development Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R., 133 B.R. 648 (D. Minn. 1991),
considered its Union Scrap reasoning in the context of a PRP contribution ac-
tion. In Sylvester Bros., a PRP sought contribution under CERCLA from the
bankrupt debtor. The debtor was not identified by the government as a PRP
until after the confirmation of its Chapter 11 plan and was not actually aware
of its liability to the government until after the completion of its bankruptcy
reorganization. Id. at 650-51. The court held that the debtor's liability to the
government and its contribution liability to other PRPs was not discharged in
its earlier bankruptcy. Id at 653. The court based its decision on the debtor's
failure to disclose its CERCLA liabilities in its earlier bankruptcy proceedings
and the government agency's lack of actual knowledge of its potential CER-
CLA action in time to file a claim against the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Id
Thus, Sylvester Bros., and Union Scrap to a limited extent, suggest that if the
EPA can establish that it had not detected or was not aware of the debtor's
liability for the release of hazardous substances prior to the completion of the
debtor's bankruptcy, the EPA's right to seek reimbursement for its cleanup
costs will not be discharged.
It is unclear whether other courts will recognize this distinction between
pre- and postbankruptcy detection of a hazardous substance release because
courts, in other contexts, have not considered detection of the injuries produc-
ing the liability to be a necessary factor for a bankruptcy claim. See, e.g.,
Grady v. A.H. Robins, 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir.) (Dalkon Shield user had
claim subject to automatic stay even though injury not apparent from use of
contraceptive), cert dismissed sub nom Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co., 487 U.S.
1260 (1988); Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 694 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1986) (patient's claim barred though injuries from debtor's prepetition negli-
gent treatment not detected until after the debtor's bankruptcy); In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 686-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (person exposed to
asbestos had claim despite absence of manifest injury.).
Aside from delaying the debtor's fresh start, using detection as the basis
for determining when a claim arises could delay the cleanup of hazardous
wastes. If the EPA recognizes that its claim for cleanup costs will not be dis-
charged until it detects environmental contamination, the agency has no incen-
tive to expedite its investigation of possible environmental contamination or to
undertake immediate cleanup efforts. Moreover, the EPA's ability to control
when the investigation of hazardous substance releases are commenced and
when cleanup funds are expended could result in treating similar claims dif-
ferently. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986) (allowing third-party actions to determine the existence or nonexistence
of a claim permits "parties to artificially juggle their existing substantive
rights by deciding for themselves the best time to serve process"); In re Yanks,
49 B.R. 56, 58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (stating that it would be "inequitable" to
allow a creditor to preserve his claim against debtor simply by postponing col-
lection efforts until after the bankruptcy proceedings); see also Mabey &
Jarvis, supra note 72, at 704 (arguing that allowing the creditor to decide when
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to investigate the debtor's prebankruptcy activities and assess
the magnitude of any hazardous substance release. Once the
EPA has completed its investigation, the court then should re-
quire the agency to file a claim valuing the debtor's potential
liability under CERCLA. 2 9 Although the debtor, as a responsi-
ble party, potentially could be held severally liable for all of the
cleanup costs, 130 the EPA should propose a CERCLA liability
estimate that approximates the amount for which it would set-
tle the case with a solvent PRP.13'
To circumvent the courts' inability to determine the legal-
ity and magnitude of the EPA's recovery actions prior to
agency enforcement, 3 2 the bankruptcy court should grant the
EPA considerable leeway in valuing its CERCLA reimburse-
ment claim.133 In the absence of compelling evidence that it is
arbitrarily overinflated,L34 the EPA's estimate should function
as the agency's CERCLA claim against the debtor's bankruptcy
estate.135
"it will sue on a claim" will promote "inconsistent results in identical factual
settings").
129. Because CERCLA requires the EPA to prioritize cleanup efforts and
focus its resources on those sites ranked near the top of its National Priority
List (NPL), see supra note 18, the agency may argue that this proposal would
pressure it to investigate and take remedial actions at sites dictated, not by the
severity of the contamination, but by the financial status of the polluter. Two
rebuttals exist. First, in the event the debtor is liquidating pursuant to Chap-
ter 7, the EPA will not be able to recover any of its response costs unless it
expedites its investigation and files a claim against the debtor. The EPA's fail-
ure to recover its response costs at sites not yet placed on the NPL will reduce
the resources available to cleanup more severely contaminated sites. Second,
without a cursory investigation of the pollution caused by the PRP, the EPA
cannot accurately ascertain whether it warrants the highest priority cleanup.
130. See supra note 22.
131. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 29-30, 116 and accompanying text.
133. Although requiring the EPA to make a preliminary estimate of the
bankrupt debtor's CERCLA liability imposes some .initial burdens on the
agency, if the agency is given sufficient time to conduct its investigation, the
burden on the EPA probably will approximate the efforts the agency would
undertake before proposing a cleanup settlement agreement with solvent
PRPs. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. Moreover, the additional
onus placed on the EPA must be balanced against the agency's inability to re-
cover any of its future cleanup costs.
134. When the court is required to place a value on a government claim, it
should consider the debtor's interest in successfully reorganizing. Without
limiting the value of the government's claim according the debtor's ability to
pay, the reorganization may be infeasible. See supra note 50.
135. Congress granted the bankruptcy courts broad equitable power to "is-
sue any order... necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the
Code.]" 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). Because neither the Code nor the Rules of
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Once the bankruptcy court establishes the value of the
EPA's claim, 36 it should order the bankruptcy trustee or
debtor-in-possession to establish a cleanup trust fund to be used
to offset future environmental response costs.137 The EPA's
share of the debtor's estate, as determined by the Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy Procedure provide any express guidance on how to estimate con-
tingent or unliquidated claims, courts have wide discretion in this area. See
Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134, 135-36 (3d. Cir. 1982); see also Benja-
min Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: Treatment
of Contingent and Unliquidated Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code, 15 UCC
L.J. 373, 379 (1983) (discussing varying approaches courts have used for treat-
ing contingent and unliquidated claims). One court has identified the options
available to the bankruptcy courts in estimating the value of claims to include
"accepting the claimant's claim at face value, estimating the claim at zero and
waiving discharge of the claim..., arriving at its independent estimation of
the claim, or utilizing a jury trial to obtain an accurate estimation." In re Fed-
eral Press Co., 116 B.R. 650, 653 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989). It appears that the
Cede gives the bankruptcy court, or the district court acting on behalf of the
bankruptcy court, the authority to accept temporarily the EPA's estimate as
the value of its claim.
136. As a result of mandatory withdrawal of reference, the district court,
as opposed to the bankruptcy court, may be responsible for estimating the
value of the debtor's CERCLA liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988). In In re
National Gypsum Co., 134 B.R. 188 (N.D. Tex. 1991), the court rejected the
debtor's argument that estimation of a claim was purely a bankruptcy law is-
sue. The court held that mandatory withdrawal was required even when esti-
mation of the value of the CERCLA bankruptcy claim was needed. Id, at 193.
137. Although the creation of a trust fund frequently has been used to en-
sure that money is available to tort victims holding contingent claims, see, e.g.,
In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 751 (E.D. Va. 1988), qff'd sub nom. A.H.
Robins v. Mabey, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); Hi-
Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc. v. Penn (In re Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc.),
70 B.R. 606, 607 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R.
618, 621-22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), affl'd, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub
nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville), 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.
1988), courts are just beginning to recognize that a trust fund may be an effec-
tive means of ensuring that environmental claimants are compensated. See Al
Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.),
126 B.R. 919, 924 (W.D. Pa. 1991); see also In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d
246, 250 (9th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that the bankruptcy court had the equita-
ble authority to establish a trust fund for future CERCLA liability); New
Jersey v. Glaucester Envtl. Management Servs., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 421, 426
(D.N.J. 1991) (a state-approved settlement agreement created a trust fund to
offset costs of ongoing remedial action); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp.,
671 F. Supp. 595, 611 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (pursuant to consent decree, polluter
placed money in trust fund to address current and future environmental obli-
gations), vacated in par4 without opinion, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988).
Several commentators have advocated the use of a trust fund to compen-
sate the government and others for claims associated with toxic wastes. See,
e.g., Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to
Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compen-
sation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575, 614-16 (1983); Note, The Manville Bankruptcy:
Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1121,
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Code's priority scheme, should be placed in the fund.138 Period-
ically, as the environmental contamination is cleaned up and
the costs are apportioned among the responsible parties, a fund
trustee should distribute fund assets to the EPA.139
To accommodate the uncertainty surrounding the estima-
tion process, all funds remaining after the entire cleanup is
complete' 40 should be made available proportionally to the
debtor's other prebankruptcy creditors. 41 If the fund is ex-
1129 n.45 (1983); Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94
HARV. L. REV. 584, 597-601 (1981).
138. Ascertaining the total value of the bankrupt debtor's assets available
for distribution to creditors would depend on whether the debtor was liquidat-
ing or reorganizing. In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the payment pool would be
funded from the debtor's nonexempt prebankruptcy assets. See supra notes
44-46 and accompanying text. In a Chapter 11 reorganization, the payment
pool would be funded using the debtor's prebankruptcy assets and post-bank-
ruptcy earnings as determined by the confirmed reorganization plan. See
supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
139. Once the court has estimated the debtor's total liabilities, creditors
should receive shares equal to the total value of the claim they are asserting.
See Roe, supra note 104, at 864-92. For example, if the debtor's cleanup liabil-
ity totaled $400,000, the EPA would receive the equivalent of 400,000 shares in
the fund. Id at 871.
140. Professor Roe has advocated using a payout method similar to a varia-
ble annuity contract in cases in which a bankrupt debtor faces large contingent
tort liabilities. Id. at 871. Under Roe's proposal, the fund trustee must calcu-
late a preliminary reimbursement ratio to measure the percentage that credi-
tors are likely to be paid on their claim. The ratio is calculated by dividing the
total value of all asserted claims against the debtor, including the claims seek-
ing reimbursement of cleanup costs, by the total contemplated value of the
fund. Id. For example, if expected claims against the fund totaled $16 million
and the projected total value of the fund was only $4 million, the payout ratio
would be 25%. If the EPA held 400,000 shares (i.e., $400,000 in claims), it po-
tentially would receive $100,000 from the fund.
To minimize the risk of overcompensating earlier claimants at the ex-
pense of subsequent creditors, the fund trustee periodically would distribute
the fund proceeds based on the projected payout ratio. Id at 870. The fund
trustee would determine the number and timing of these periodic payouts
based on a projection of when all of the contingent bankruptcy claims, includ-
ing EPA's CERCLA claim, would accrue. The trustee should proportionally
distribute part of each creditor's share value immediately. Periodically, as new
estimates of the aggregate amount of contingent claims become available, the
payout ratio would be adjusted. Under this proposal, creditors with the high-
est priority, which may include the EPA with its administrative expense
claims, should be paid in full before lower priority claimholders are
compensated.
141. Absent unanticipated difficulties, the court should limit the time
frame in which the government is allowed to assert its reimbursement claims.
On the date established by the court, the fund trustee should calculate the fi-
nal payout ratio and proportionally distribute the remaining fund assets to the
EPA and other creditors. This approach would not only ensure equitable com-
pensation of the bankrupt debtor's creditors; it also would provide the EPA
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hausted prior to the completion of the cleanup, the EPA should
be allowed to bring an action to determine the cause of the defi-
cit. If additional cleanup funds are needed to remove hazard-
ous substances from locations that were unknown and
unforeseeable during the debtor's bankruptcy case, the EPA
should be allowed to assert additional reimbursement claims
against the reorganized debtor.14 If, however, the additional
cleanup was foreseeable, the court should bar future recovery.
2. Detecting Contamination After the Debtor's Bankruptcy
The second context in which courts may be asked to deter-
mine the discharge of CERCLA liability occurs when prepeti-
tion releases are discovered after the conclusion of the debtor's
bankruptcy case. Courts facing this question should focus on
whether the reorganized debtor's liability for the release of
hazardous substances was foreseeable prior to the completion
of the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings.
In assessing whether the debtor's CERCLA liability was
foreseeable, courts should examine two factors: whether haz-
ardous substances previously had been detected on the debtor's
property or on property to which the debtor had processed or
shipped waste; and whether the debtor's prebankruptcy activi-
ties involved potential hazardous substance releases. If the
debtor was responsible for or associated with a detected release
of pollutants before entering bankruptcy, some CERCLA liabil-
ity undoubtedly was foreseeable. Similarly, if the debtor oper-
ated a business that produced, used, processed, or transported
any type of hazardous substances, the debtor's future liability
under CERCLA probably would have been foreseeable.
with an incentive to expedite its investigation and cleanup. If the EPA's inves-
tigation and cleanup is not completed within a reasonable time, so that the
court can accurately assess the total value of the EPA's future cleanup costs,
the EPA's ability to recover postbankruptcy cleanup costs from the debtor
should be limited.
142. It is unsettled whether estimation caps liability for purposes of partici-
pation in the final distribution of the debtor's estate. Some courts have held
that the estimated value functions as a cap on the debtor's liability. See, e.g.,
In re Storage-Technology Corp., 77 B.R. 824, 825 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); In re
Baldwin-United Corp., 57 B.R. 751, 758 (S.D. Ohio 1985). Others courts, citing
§ 502(j), have been willing to reconsider the allowed claim under certain cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., In re MacDonald, 128 B.R. 161, 168 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1991); In re Lane, 68 B.R. 609, 613 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986); In re Nova Real Es-
tate Inv. Trust, 23 B.R. 62, 66 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982). However, having estima-
tion function as a cap will provide the EPA with an incentive to expedite its
investigation and cleanup.
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If the EPA did not investigate the debtor's potential CER-
CLA liability at the time of the debtor's bankruptcy, courts
should bar the agency from pursuing any postbankruptcy
claims against the debtor. If, however, the EPA diligently in-
vestigated the debtor's responsibility for hazardous substance
releases, the court should evaluate the detected contamination
on a substance-by-substance and location-by-location basis to
determine whether the EPA could or should have foreseen the
subsequent manifestation of contamination while the debtor's
bankruptcy was pending. If the answer is yes, the court should
bar the EPA from pursuing postconfirmation recovery from the
reorganized debtor. The courts should, however, allow the
EPA to pursue postbankruptcy CERCLA claims associated
with contamination that could not have been anticipated at the
time of the debtor's discharge.143
B. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FORESEEABILITY APPROACH
By focusing on the foreseeability of the debtor's CERCLA
liability, courts in both of the contexts described above can ex-
tend the term "claim" to its broadest possible limit without un-
dermining the EPA's recovery of cleanup costs.144 Any right to
payment under CERCLA that is "contingent"-i.e., within the
143. This Note has focused primarily on recovery by the EPA. In many
cases, private parties assert claims against the bankrupt debtor. In general,
this should not affect the applicability of the foreseeability approach proposed
by this Note. The courts should discharge a PRP's CERCLA contribution
claims only to the extent the liability was or is foreseeable at the time of the
debtor's bankruptcy. However, a PRP's ability to recover from the debtor's
bankruptcy estate will depend upon whether its contribution claim is or can be
liquidated before the completion of the bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(e)(1)(B) (1988); see also Syntex Corp. v. Charter Co. (In re Charter Co.),
862 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that CERCLA contribution claims
that are contingent and unliquidated during the pendency of the bankruptcy
of another PRP will be disallowed); Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re Hem-
ingway Transp., Inc.), 126 B.R. 656, 661-62 (D. Mass. 1991) (same).
144. Premising a legal right on foreseeability occurs in tort law. See W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (5th
ed. 1984). Under tort principles, if an individual cannot reasonably foresee any
injury as the result of her act, the injury is said not to be "proximately caused"
by the actor's conduct. Id. Without proximate cause, the actor cannot be held
liable for negligence. Id. § 42, at 273. The courts have applied varied tests for
determining whether or not a tort injury was foreseeable. They generally con-
sider an injury to be foreseeable unless it was unusual and surprising in light
of the facts. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that the conse-
quences of an action are not foreseeable, if after looking back in time, with full
knowledge of all that has occurred, the event still appears to be "highly ex-
traordinary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965).
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contemplation of the parties-will be discharged. 45 Moreover,
limiting dischargeable claims to those that are foreseeable is
consistent with the debtor's fresh start because the liability that
the debtor can anticipate at the time of its bankruptcy will be
discharged. Only liability for which the EPA and other credi-
tors cannot reasonably be expected to assert their rights will es-
cape discharge.
In addition, using foreseeability as the benchmark for de-
termining whether a dischargeable bankruptcy claim exists
should expedite the detection and cleanup of environmental
contamination. Under this approach, the debtor's motivation to
hide its pollution is reduced because the CERCLA liability will
not be discharged unless the release of hazardous substances is
detected or reasonably foreseeable prior to the completion of
the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, to increase the
likelihood of obtaining a discharge, the debtor has an incentive
to provide information regarding its use and release of hazard-
ous substances. The more assistance the debtor provides to the
EPA, the more inclined the courts should be to find that the
debtor's liability was foreseeable and thus discharged. More-
over, this would give the EPA an incentive to expedite its in-
vestigation into potential environmental problems so that it
will not be precluded from asserting future claims that a court
may later deem to have been foreseeable during the pendency
of the debtor's bankruptcy. The debtor's cooperation, coupled
with expedited EPA efforts, should speed the detection and
cleanup of hazardous wastes.
CONCLUSION
CERCLA holds polluters financially accountable for the
environmental contamination they cause. The Bankruptcy
Code provides a system in which a debtor's obligations can be
estimated, paid with the debtor's available assets, and subse-
quently discharged. A conflict between these laws arises when
a debtor seeks to be discharged from a cleanup obligation that
145. When the cleanup of hazardous substances has not been completed,
courts are likely to consider the EPA's right to payment as a contingent claim.
See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1005
(2d Cir. 1991). Before a right to payment can be considered a contingent claim
capable of discharge, however, the EPA's right to payment must be foresee-
able. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. Consequently, the Bank-
ruptcy Code already requires courts to consider whether or not a bankrupt
debtor's environmental cleanup liability is foreseeable before it can classify a
creditor's rights as a "contingent claim."
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has not fully matured at the time of the bankruptcy. This Note
argues that the three approaches courts have adopted to deter-
mine when a CERCLA claim arises in bankruptcy are
inadequate.
An analysis of the dischargeability of environmental
cleanup obligations should begin with a consideration of
whether or not the debtor's CERCLA liability is foreseeable. If
the contamination is foreseeable, the claim should be included
in the debtor's liquidation or reorganization plan. If, however,
the CERCLA claim is not foreseeable, the cleanup liability
should remain with the debtor. This approach fosters the
debtor's fresh start without discounting CERCLA's dual objec-
tives of expediting cleanup and ensuring that responsible par-
ties bear the costs.
